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Abstract	  
The Internet of Toys (IoToys) refers to the small subset of the Internet of 
Things often marketed to children and their caregivers as smart toys. These 
toys include many of the affordances of screen-based, networked 
technologies, packaged as children’s everyday playthings. Thus, Hello Barbie 
uses voice recognition and cloud-based computing combined with artificial 
intelligence procedures to craft meaningful responses to children’s statements 
and engage them in quasi-naturalistic conversation. Other IoToys also include 
image recognition and geo-locational data collection. Such toys can also be 
constructed in different ways that represent the perspectives of the speaker 
and circumstances of use. Thus Germany’s Federal Network Agency 
announced in February that it classified the My Friend Cayla doll (a 
competitor to Barbie) as an ‘illegal espionage apparatus’ because ‘under 
German law it is illegal to manufacture, sell or possess surveillance devices 
disguised as another object’. The IoToys facilitates both commercial relations 
and income streams for the manufacturers and/or associated organisations, 
such as marketing agencies, software providers and voice analytics services. 
These streams of income can include advertising to children through the 
connected toy, the collection, analysis and monetisation of children’s data 
and the sale of the toy itself. Buying the toy also involves long-term 
contractual agreements that transfer legal responsibility for the collection, 
analysis and distribution of children’s data onto their parents. This effectively 
gives commercial entities the authority to continue and conceivably expand 
upon data-collecting and data-sharing procedures. This article analyses the 
discursive construction of the future IoToys using textual analysis of media 
resources that provide stakeholder perspectives on this emerging field. It 
argues that, given their status as an emerging category of human–computer 
interaction devices, objects that can be classified as part of the IoToys 
currently occupy a controversial and contested media industries space, raising 
many regulatory and policy questions that children themselves are not 
equipped to consider or take into account. 
Keywords: children’s rights; discourse analysis; Internet of Toys; revenue streams; 
surveillance; privacy 
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Introduction	  
The Internet of Toys (IoToys) is an emergent category of goods marketed to parents as 
smart toys and to children as fun. These items offer children an augmented play 
experience in that smart toys are connected via wi-fi to cloud computing technologies 
and incorporate a range of hi-tech features such as image-recognition software, geo-
location tagging and movement sensors. A brief survey of the range of stakeholders in 
the IoToys industry ecosystem indicates the vested interests at play: 
• toy manufacturers 
• software and hardware developers 
• privacy and security specialists 
• commercial/advertiser interests 
• policy-makers and regulators 
• consumer and advocacy groups 
• media commentators 
• children 
• parents. 
Given the many stakeholders implicated in this emerging technological and 
commercial space, it is unsurprising that the discursive construction of the IoToys is 
highly contested. 
This article analyses multiple stakeholder positions on IoToys development, and 
examines the manner by which different stakeholders construct the materiality of 
internet-connected toys: as data-collecting technologies and enterprises that threaten 
children’s data privacy and security; as positive, educational and fun products for 
children; as sophisticated AI technologies at the forefront of technological innovation; 
as hackable, insecure technologies that may be hijacked by others and threaten 
individual children’s safety; as platforms for further commercial marketing to children; 
as controversial, paradigm-shifting technologies worthy of news coverage; or as 
nothing of particular concern, to be responded to in a low-key manner. 
The authors argue that, despite these diverse discursive constructions all vying 
against each other, the two most dominant voices are both commercially based: the toy 
companies themselves and their associated IT support services; and/or privacy and 
security entrepreneurial individuals or companies. These commercial entities use 
contrasting ways to make parents responsible for their child’s activities: the toy 
companies and associated support services make parents responsible for the social and 
educational progress and behaviour of their children; and privacy and security 
entrepreneurs make parents responsible for their child’s online safety. Children’s rights 
to participation and protection, on the other hand, are embedded in lesser discourses 
taken on by consumer groups in Europe and the United States that have contributed to 
debate around the introduction of connected toys, as well as the emergence of 
regulatory and policy investigations and discussions in Europe and North America. 
However, little movement in this space is occurring in Australia. 
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Methodology	  
This article adopts a ‘political economy of communication’ framework to explore ‘the 
study of the social relations, especially the power relations, that mutually constitute the 
production, distribution, and consumption of resources’ (Mosco, 2009, p. 25). In this 
case, the resources considered were media resources that were available in the general 
public sphere applicable to the IoToys during the period 15 November 2016 to 
10 January 2017, as well as an augmented purposive sampling of publicly available 
discourses in order to fully analyse the nine stakeholder discourses. The original 
sampling involved 203 commentaries, and 47 advertisements were collected from 
public media in twelve countries: Australia, Austria, Finland, Germany, Italy, Lithuania, 
Malta, Portugal, Romania, Serbia, Slovenia and Spain. These commentaries and ads 
were then analysed and coded for outlet type, toy type, positive or negative statements, 
centrality of children within the discourse, risks mentioned, opportunities cited, the 
origins of the commentary and the voices being used within the commentary: parents, 
children, toy industry, Internet industry, government, institutions, NGOs, consumer 
groups, researchers, manufacturers, internet security experts/companies and so on. The 
findings and discussion around this analyses were published in 2017 and comprised 
discussions about the parental responsibilisation discourses evident within the public 
commentaries, the gendered nature of connected toys, the risks and benefits of 
connected toys evident in the commentaries, and global and local insights connected 
with the development and take-up of the toys (Mascheroni & Holloway, 2017). 
As can be appreciated, different elements of the nine sets of stakeholders identified 
above are differently invested in the production, distribution and consumption of 
IoToys-related media accessible via the general public sphere. Furthermore, two 
perspectives were almost entirely absent from the data collected: parents’ and 
children’s voices – apart from cases where parents were also security experts, or toy 
manufacturers. Given this absence of general comments representing these stakeholder 
categories, they will not be considered further in this article; however, they remain a 
critical absence in the discursive record. It should be noted here that there is, however, 
an emerging children’s public sphere where IoToys are presented and played with, 
with YouTube now having many ‘unboxing’ and ‘play with me’ videos with connected 
toys. 
The analysis in this article utilises the data gathered above as a starting point for 
inquiry; however, the analysis does not seek to quantify different stakeholder 
perspectives, or an investigation of relative ‘share of voice’ (Hansen & Christensen, 
2005; Macnamara, 2005, p. 21). The originally collected media texts were augmented 
by a purposive search from newspapers, magazines, blogs, product reviews, parenting 
forums, mummy bloggers, parenting magazines and so on, to further capture the 
perspectives of stakeholders who were under-represented in the initial dataset, even 
though everyday parents and children remained under-represented. Using constant 
comparative analysis (Fram, 2013) to evaluate each stakeholder’s constructions of the 
IoToys, this article explores the range of speaking positions and discourses through 
which the political economy of the IoToys is framed within the general public sphere. 
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Selected media texts were further analysed using critical discourse analysis (Fairclough, 
1992, 1995) to establish their contribution to the contested construction of the IoToys. 
This article has a range of limitations. The first is that this analysis – as with all 
discourse analysis – does not examine or quantify the impact of any of the public 
discourses analysed on their audiences. On the other hand, the media do play a role in 
the amplification of concern and risk via publicly available commentary (Thiesse, 
2007). They then also play a ‘significant role in forming and shaping risk scenarios’ 
(Slettemeås, 2009, pp. 230–1) to inform design, policy and the public. The second 
limitation is that the sample of materials analysed is effectively one of convenience, 
since the core of the dataset had already been collected. The purpose of this article, 
however, is the identification of the diversity in discursive constructions relating to this 
topic area, rather than an assessment of proportionality for each position (Mascheroni 
& Holloway, 2017). In this circumstance, a convenience sample underpinning an 
established contribution to the field (Holloway & Green, 2016), augmented by a 
purposive search to address identified gaps and absences, constitutes the data for a 
critical investigation. As this investigation relies on accessible media texts, it aims to 
cover examples of constructions of the IoToys attributed to each of the sets of 
stakeholders identified. It then uses those materials to interrogate the possible existence 
of further groups of stakeholders and/or missing voices, such as parents and children.  
This investigation will analyse the dataset established, addressing the following 
research question: 
What does a critical discourse analysis of media commentary relating to the 
IoToys tell us about the variety of speaking positions occupied by 
stakeholders, and the discursive constructions of this set of ICT devices? 
Children’s	  play	  and	  the	  IoToys	  
Although there is a general absence of parent, family, child and community discussion of 
the IoToys in the general public sphere, there is work around new and emerging digital 
toys that indicates the need for ethnographic research with a particular IoToys focus. 
Significant scholarly attention has already been paid to digital toys and hybrid play, and 
some of that work will be considered briefly here to create a context for the commentary 
that constitutes the political economy of communication in the area of IoToys.  
Marsh and colleagues (2017) firmly locate the growing digital competencies of even 
very young children (aged two to four years) within their family context. Their study of four 
families with young children indicated the ‘children were immersed in a range of 
multimedia, multimodal practices which involved extensive engagement with other family 
members who scaffolded their learning and delighted in the children’s technological 
capabilities’ (2017, p. 47). Part of this ‘delight’ in children’s technological and digital 
prowess reflects generally held beliefs that: 
It is necessary but no longer sufficient for children to develop competence in 
relation to written texts; they also need to be able to engage successfully with 
multimodal, multimedia texts if they are to acquire the range of skills, knowledge 
and understanding necessary to navigate the knowledge economy of the 
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21st century. (Marsh et al., 2017, p. 48, referencing Lankshear & Knobel, 2011). 
This, then, is the high-stakes context in which parental investment in digital play 
experiences, and internet-connected toys, takes place.  
The IoToys is one specific aspect of children’s digital technology use, and the 
younger the child, the more reliant they are on parental guidance to avoid behaviours 
that include risks of unexpected or unanticipated consequences (such as an early years 
digital footprint, or monetisation of a child’s online data). Jayemanne and Nanson 
(2016, p. 135) explore the concept of younger children’s digital dexterity in the context 
of touchscreen devices via ‘themes of imagination, encounter, and mobilization’, 
where ‘how media are imagined is situated in relation to interface studies, debates 
about the naturalness of NUI [natural user interfaces, … and how] mobile media and 
gestural interfaces influence children’s play, education and development’. The 
facilitation of children’s encounters with such touchscreen technologies is a specific 
aspect of ‘technology domestication within the home’, as Marsh and colleagues (2017, 
p. 135), demonstrate. Finally, Jayemanne and Nanson (2016, p. 147, citing Lupton, 
2013) discuss mobilisation in terms of parental mediation and the ‘ongoing process of 
interembodiment’, ‘to designate the communicative circuit between parent, child and 
mobile touch-screen device’. These aspects of imagination, encounter and mobilisation 
are arguably of even greater importance where there is no necessary computer screen, 
and where an internet-connected toy might be activated by voice-recognition 
technology or movement sensors. In many IoToys, the digital aspects of the technology, 
and its connection to the internet, are deliberately obscured so that the toy seems to 
conform to conventional analogue expectations of (say) a teddy bear or a doll. This can 
have privacy and regulatory implications, such as those faced by the My Friend Cayla 
doll (BBC, 2017; Walker, 2017), and children’s smart watches (Singleton, 2017; 
Wakefield, 2017) in Germany. 
Tyni and colleagues (2016) examine what they term ‘hybrid playful experiences: 
playing between material and digital’, noting that ‘the dynamic and smart capabilities 
of computer software, sensors and networks provide, at least in principle, limitless 
opportunities for transforming the mute physical object into something that can sense, 
react and invite to rich, playful interactions’ (2016, p. 16). Noting the ‘constantly 
advancing frontier of playful hybrid products, environments and associated services’ 
Tyni and colleagues (2016, p. 16) go on to argue that it is ‘becoming difficult to detect 
miniature chips, power sources and printed circuitry embedded in various, seemingly 
common, everyday objects’. As these authors note of ‘smart toys’, ‘using an online 
connection or a smartphone as an element of the product experience allows users to 
modify and rejuvenate their experiences … A shared characteristic between most smart 
toys is that they can be updated, ideally providing prolonged usage. This, subsequently, 
can be seen [as] turning the toys into evolving services’ (2016, p. 53). For the various 
IoToys stakeholders, the capacity of a toy to offer a range of novel and evolving 
experiences means that the toy can change and grow with its owner, or in line with 
new opportunities to monetise the product as these emerge. 
The commercial aspects of the IoToys include the physical sale of the toy itself and 
the requirements of its connectability (such as wireless internet and, potentially, a 
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subscription to a package of features); the sale of the data generated by child users to 
other commercial interests; and the commercialisation of the messages conveyed to the 
child by the IoToy communication system (Holloway & Green, 2016). Grimes (2015, 
p. 110), examining the commercialisation aspects of comparatively well-established 
children’s virtual worlds, argues that: 
These games are designed to mobilize virtual economies for real money 
transaction and self-promotion, utilizing game mechanics, virtual items, 
and other features for various forms of branding and third-party advertising 
strategies … such processes work to mobilize players’ affective labor, while 
concurrently limiting potentially important opportunities for participation, 
communication, access, and cultural rights, such as freedom of speech.  
Giddings (2017, p. 59) makes a similar point concerning Pokémon Go:  
the workings of imagination in children’s lives have always populated 
mundane experience with nonactual actions and characters, and these 
processes have been mechanized and monetized by commercial children’s 
culture over decades, not least in the transmedia system of Pokémon itself.  
As can be seen, critical commentators such as Grimes (2015) and Giddings (2017) have 
carefully considered and analysed the ways in which a seemingly innocent play 
experience delivers value to toy manufacturers and ancillary service providers. Such 
monetisation of leisure, play and ‘educational’ experiences (as with app-enabled 
products) is rarely overt or explicitly consented to. Indeed, parents might believe that 
regulations expressly forbid such commercialisation of children’s data or the 
monetisation of children’s ‘affective labour’ – that is, ‘where social relations and peer 
dynamics are reported to generate an enormous amount of surplus value’ (Grimes 2015, 
p. 126). Given that such matters are opaque in the contractual communication 
between toy purveyors and parents or other bill-payers, they are rarely appreciated at 
all by the children themselves. 
Acknowledging these complications, one way forward is to focus on a children’s 
rights perspective, in order to make children’s rights central to: 
children’s formal and informal learning; health and wellbeing; literacy; 
civic and/or political participation; play and recreation; identity; belonging; 
peer, family and intergenerational relationships; individual and community 
resilience; and consumer practices (Livingstone & Third, 2017, p. 666, 
citing Swist et al., 2015). 
This rights-based perspective is generally absent from the general public sphere 
discussions of the IoToys, except in discourse promoted and circulated by consumer 
and advocacy groups, and repeated in media commentary. In other words, this 
discursive position is recognised largely by its absence.  
The discussion now turns to consideration of the various discourses and speaking 
positions identified in the analysis of perspectives readily accessible via the general 
public sphere.  
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Findings	  
Toy	  manufacturers	  
Since toy manufacturers are the key instigators of goods and services for the IoToys, 
their discursive currency tends to be positive and aspirational. Thus Mattel says of its 
flagship IoToy product Hello Barbie that it is the doll ‘that converses with kids, 
remembers things they say, and recalls details later’ (Newman, 2015). For busy, 
distracted parents, increasingly challenged by the recall of detail, such a product offers 
clear opportunities for their child to refine their verbal engagement and technology 
skills. Indeed, educational and techno-savvy discourses are significant elements of the 
manufacturers’ promotion of the IoToys, with products available that support 
individualised child-centred learning experiences, and the early acquisition of digital 
skills such as coding. Programmable robots Dash and Dot, for children aged from five 
to eight years, are said to ‘ignite curiosity and confidence while providing fun ways of 
learning the essential skills of collaboration, communication, and digital literacy’ 
(Wonder Toys, n.d.); while the programming of kids-size 3D printer ThingMaker is 
designed to get children ‘interested in design and manufacturing, as well as developing 
their creative skills to make their own objects’ (Barrett, 2016).  
Even if the manufacturer’s preferred discourse is one of benefit and unproblematic 
enjoyment, the countervailing power relations existing in this sphere pose a challenge 
to the credibility of these claims. White hat hackers (Caldwell, 2013; Moini, 2017), 
internet security experts who work to expose vulnerabilities in IoToys products, have 
often disrupted the preferred manufacturers’ discourse, prompting toy developers to 
engage in a defensive minimisation of security risks along with a public display of 
concerned commitment to action where required. Thus VTech (2016) constructed a 
dedicated site to demonstrate the seriousness it attributed to the 2015 hacking of its 
VTech Learning Lodge stable of products. It also closed down a range of services and 
took the products offline for remediation, although it was unclear what differentiated 
those products that were returned to the market from those that were removed 
permanently. According to Bogart (2016), however, the contrition was more apparent 
than real: VTech quietly changed its terms and conditions of service to ensure that 
liability for future hacks was shifted to the users of the toys. Thus the company 
exonerated itself from responsibility for any harm to users by introducing new consents 
required for consumer access.  
Software	  and	  hardware	  developers	  
Toy manufacturers such as Mattel generally lack the skill set and technical infrastructure 
required to venture unsupported into the IoToys space. In the case of Hello Barbie, Mattel 
partnered with IoToy digital specialists Toytalk. These developers of software and 
hardware tend to be allocated the ‘speaking position’ when there are threats to the 
integrity of the product – for example, when an IoToy product has been hacked. The 
communicative register, ‘referring to situationally defined varieties [of language]’ (Biber, 
1995, p. 1) in this case, is somewhat different when the speaker is a technology 
specialist, compared with when they are a non-tech-specialist toy manufacturer. Thus 
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Mattel’s technology partner ToyTalk responded to one of the Hello Barbie hacks with 
an implied request for the cyber attackers to acknowledge that the company had 
exceeded the general level of security performance, even if the toy had proven 
vulnerable. 
On behalf of ToyTalk, Martin Reddy argued that it had ‘added client certificate 
authentication [to Hello Barbie], above and beyond what most Internet-connected 
devices do, as a way to deter a casual attacker’ (cited in Adhikari, 2015). Here, the 
discourse is one of expert to expert – in effect, paying a compliment to the hacker 
(they’re not ‘casual’) and asking for validation of the additional focus on security. 
Reddy also asserted that, even if the product security could be compromised, the 
impact would be limited since, according to ToyTalk, even a successful hack allows 
‘no access to WiFi passwords, no access to child audio data, and cannot change what 
the doll says’ (Adhikari, 2015). In at least one instance, this ToyTalk discursive strategy 
seems to have worked. White hat hacker Jakubowski responded by admitting that Hello 
Barbie featured ‘good levels of security that you don’t typically see in many IoToys 
devices. ToyTalk has certainly taken many of the concerns and has addressed them as 
best as they could’ (Bogart, 2015). This all-tech-friends-together tone of exchange was 
reinforced by ToyTalk’s subsequent announcement that it was ‘creating a “bug bounty” 
program that will reward security researchers for responsibly disclosing security 
vulnerabilities’ (Bogart, 2015). 
In other cases, the discursive register of toy manufacturers is changed to speak 
directly to the consumer market. Thus Bob Delprincipe, the inventor of My Friend 
Cayla, which he claims to be the first internet-connected doll (Wallop, 2014), marketed 
by UK toymaker Vivid, says of Cayla, ‘She’s not a search engine, she’s a seven-year-old 
girl. There are some things she just doesn’t know’ [… the journalist notes that] Say the 
word ‘crap’ to the doll, and she answers: ‘That’s inappropriate.’ Ask her where babies 
come from and she says: ‘I don’t know. You better ask your teacher.”’ (Wallop, 2014). 
Unsurprisingly, some tech hackers have taken this as an invitation to get Cayla to say 
some very choice words not included in the average seven-year-old girl’s vocabulary 
(PenTestPartners, n.d.). 
Privacy	  and	  security	  specialists	  
As demonstrated by this discussion of software and hardware developers’ discursive 
interventions within the general public sphere, some privacy and security specialists 
gain their speaking privileges from what they do by using their technological expertise 
to prove their point by exploiting and publicising the technical vulnerabilities of the 
IoToys. For example, SBS News (2015) cites the alleged white hat VTech hacker’s 
comment to online security publication Motherboard: ‘Frankly, it makes me sick that I 
was able to get all this stuff’. Australian security specialist Stilgherrian (quoted in Timms, 
2015) suggests that: 
We’re going to see more and more of this kind of security vulnerability 
crop up, simply because we’re getting companies, in this case it’s a toy 
manufacturer, none of these organisations have a tradition or have the 
internal company infrastructure to constantly test and retest their devices 
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and issue security updates for it … If we’re having trouble convincing 
people they need to install the security updates on their phone, it’s going to 
be a lot harder to convince them to update the software on their doll. 
The ‘privacy and security specialist’ category can also include the inverse skills, the 
specialist black hat hackers who have malicious intent when compromising IoToys. 
This seems to be the case with the hack of CloudPet Teddy Bear, which had impacted 
at least 800,000 people by February 2017 (Moini, 2017). In this instance, there was no 
friendly inter-exchange between the hackers and the toy manufacturers or their tech 
partners – indeed, the hackers’ aim seems to have been malicious. According to 
Chester (2017), ‘along with the database of user names and email addresses, the 
hackers also had access to 2.2 million recorded messages between children speaking to 
their toys’. Hunt (2017) states that ‘The CloudPets data was accessed many times by 
unauthorised parties before being deleted and then on multiple occasions, held for 
ransom.’ 
Commercial/advertiser	  interests	  
There are some indications that negative messages about the IoToys are making an 
impact in the marketplace and affecting the sales of these toys. Hunt (2017) points out 
that at the point when the CloudPets hack story was broken, the company’s share price 
was less than 1 per cent of its previous highs, and hovering at US$0.0044 cents per 
share (on 22 February 2017). The discursive positions of media commentators have 
clear impacts in this case. 
Other commercial interests, however, see an advantage to ‘linked selling’ and 
third-party advertising via the IoToys. This is the case with the suspected alliance 
between Disney and Genesis, the manufacturer of My Friend Cayla (Cayla suggests 
Disney movies to child users.) While there are no contractual relationships between the 
two companies, they both use voice recognition services provided by Nuance 
Communications – the company tasked with scripting and providing Cayla’s voice 
conversations and voice analytics for My Doll Cayla (Mlot, 2016). 
As part of the flurry of IoToys commentary that often circulates in the media 
alongside the Christmas present-buying season (in this case, 8 December), Roberts 
(2016) notes that the Electronic Privacy Information Centre (supported by the Campaign 
for a Commercial Free Childhood and the Center for Digital Democracy) had filed a 
complaint with the US Federal Trade Commission (EPIC, 2016) which alleges the 
following about the IoToys smart doll: 
My Friend Cayla is pre-programmed with dozens of phrases that reference 
Disney movies and theme parks. For example, Cayla tells children that her 
favorite movie is Disney’s The Little Mermaid and her favorite song is ‘Let it 
Go’ from Disney’s Frozen. ‘Cayla also tells children she loves going to 
Disneyland and wants to go to Epcot in Disneyworld,’ says the complaint, 
which says such activity amounts to a deceptive form of product placement. 
(Roberts, 2016) 
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It would seem that this commercial alliance is post hoc, since on the initial release of 
the toy it was noted that Cayla’s favourite film was ‘The Sound of Music – chosen so 
that there are no licensing issues with a Disney film’ (Wallop, 2014). This allegation of 
product placement, and the discursive content that speaking IoToys communicate to 
their young owners, indicates that manufacturers are diversifying their income streams 
from these products. Not only are they providing consumer goods for children, they are 
providing commentary on behalf of commercial organisations and ‘it is becoming more 
and more common for smart toys to store and sell data about how they are played with’ 
(Tait, 2016). In general, however, the voices of commercial interests invested in the 
IoToys – apart from the companies that make, market and service the products 
themselves – are absent from the public debate.  
Policy-­‐makers	  and	  regulators	  
Despite the fact that the Federal Trade Commission and the European Union have yet 
to rule on law suits filed against IoToys manufacturers, the German Federal Network 
Agency has actively banned My Friend Cayla as a ‘concealed transmitting device’ (BBC, 
2017) and an ‘illegal espionage apparatus’ (Walker, 2017), both of which are 
prohibited under Germany’s strict privacy and anti-surveillance laws. The actions of the 
Federal Network Agency reflect Germany’s recent history, in which surveillance is a 
‘particularly sensitive issue in Germany where East Germany’s Stasi secret police and 
the Nazi era Gestapo kept a close watch on the population’ (The Guardian, 2017). Not 
surprisingly, the agency has more recently banned the sale of children’s smart watches 
because they can be used to spy on others – for example parents listening in on their 
children’s teachers during class time (The Guardian, 2017). In addition to the concerns 
of this German agency, the BBC reports that Vera Jourová, the EU’s Commissioner for 
Justice, Consumers and Gender Equality, stated, ‘I’m worried about the impact of 
connected dolls on children’s privacy and safety’ (BBC, 2017). 
In Australia, the eSafety Commissioner has information about ‘Smart toys’, ‘Connected 
Toys’ and ‘Robotic Toys’ on its eSafety gift guide website (eSafety, n.d.), and it has also 
issued occasional press commentary about the Australian impact of some of the better 
publicised hacks. Thus, the then Children’s eSafety Commissioner Alastair MacGibbon said 
of the VTech hack that ‘the theft of data relating to children’ added ‘a degree of injustice’ 
to the breach. ‘Why are we collecting this information to start with? If you don’t collect 
it, you can’t lose it?’ (SBS, 2015). At present, there is no regulatory response stronger 
than consumer information on the Commission’s website, implying a low-key reactive 
discursive response rather than the more proactive stance that might be expected of an 
organisation that advocates for children’s e-safety rights. 
Consumer	  and	  advocacy	  groups	  
While privacy and security experts are increasingly attempting to engage in detailed 
exchanges with policy-makers and regulators around these different issues, consumer 
and advocacy groups in the United States and Europe have recently carried out a 
carefully orchestrated publicity campaign regarding internet-connected toys. In the 
lead-up to Christmas 2016, a collaboration of privacy and consumer groups from the 
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United States and Europe took legal action by filing a series of formal complaints with 
the European Commission (EC), the International Consumer Protection and 
Enforcement Network and product safety authorities in Norway, Belgium, France and 
the Netherlands (Europe) and the Federal Trade Commission (US). These complaints 
were based on research carried out by the Norwegian Consumer Council into safety 
and privacy issues related to Genesis’ toys, Cayla and iQue, as well as Mattel’s Hello 
Barbie. Their report Toyfail ‘revealed serious risks to, and a lack of understanding of, 
children’s rights to privacy and security’ (BEUC, 2016). 
This campaign was coordinated by the Electronic Privacy Information Centre 
(EPIC), the Campaign for a Commercial Free Childhood (CCFC), the Centre for Digital 
Democracy (CDD), and Consumers Union (in the US) and by Forbrukerradet, the 
Norwegian arm of the European Consumer Organisation BEUC (an umbrella 
organization for 43 European consumer advocacy groups) in Europe (BEUC, 2016; 
Keller & Hackman, 2016). It has also successfully challenged regulatory authorities 
across the Atlantic to pay attention to the policy and regulatory needs of this emerging 
market, particularly in terms of what needs to be done with regards to policy, practice 
and parenting advice. 
Although the Federal Trade Commission in the US is yet to rule on the EPIC suit 
(EPIC, 2017), a Congressional Investigation is taking place led by Senator Edward 
Markey (EPIC, 2016) and the EC recently instigated a joint workshop with Member 
State authorities to ensure that manufacturers and suppliers of internet-connected toys 
and apps conformed to EU law (EU, 2017). Commissioner for Justice, Consumers and 
Gender Equity Vera Jourová said:  
While technological developments and new digital products are enriching 
our daily lives, EU citizens rightly expect that their products are, first of all, 
safe. In particular, when it comes to the most vulnerable. For example, 
more and more children are playing with connected toys. Their parents 
must be able to rest assured that these toys are safe for them to play with 
and that their privacy is respected’ (EU, 2017). 
Media	  commentators	  
The media are a well-established player in the political economy of communication, 
with an accepted role in reporting the very best of ground-breaking, paradigm-shifting 
innovative advances alongside the very worst of privacy-invading, security-breaching 
assaults upon the individual and the family. These accounts might even refer to the 
same product, in the same news cycle. The overall aim of most mainstream media – 
but especially media that are commercially driven – is to gain attention and traction 
through clicks and ratings. Moderate discussion with a nuanced argument has rarely 
succeeded in achieving this. Instead, the media may sometimes play a polarising role 
(Cohen, 2002). 
At the same time, the media serve the role of being the primary provider of a 
speaking platform for diverse interest groups, including those discussed previously, and 
currently act as a kind of archival record allowing for investigations such as this one. 
Thus the media have less of a speaking position in their own right on a subject such as 
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the IoToys, and play more of an amplification or muffling role in permitting some 
voices and discursive positions to be promoted while others are muffled, suppressed or 
not sought out. 
Parents,	  children,	  families	  and	  community	  
These voices have yet to emerge clearly within the mediated general public sphere, 
apart from token interviews and responses quoted by the media to establish a human 
face for a policy discussion. Indeed, a close encounter with the general public sphere 
materials concerning the IoToys indicates that parents are more spoken to and about 
than speaking themselves. For example, Hunt warns that: 
Circling back to the parents’ position for a moment, you must assume data 
like this will end up in other people’s hands. Whether it’s the Cayla doll, 
the Barbie, the VTech tablets or the CloudPets, assume breach. It only takes 
one little mistake on behalf of the data custodian – such as misconfiguring 
the database security – and every single piece of data they hold on you and 
your family can be in the public domain in mere minutes. (Hunt, 2017) 
While it is likely that some of the featured specialist commentators, such as white hat 
hackers, have a further identity as ‘parent’ and this may explain part of their motivation 
for intervening in this space, that personal perspective is rarely made clear in the 
constructions around specialists’ discourse. Thus the speaking position for parents is 
mainly confined to individual consumer acts of acquiescence (the smart toy gets 
purchased) or resistance (the home becomes a smart toy-free zone). 
Although children’s rights in this arena (Holloway & Green, 2016) have motivated 
a range of media and expert commentary (e.g. Livingstone & Third, 2017), some 
regulator-driven intervention in Germany (BBC, 2017) and an EPIC submission to the 
US Federal Trade Commission (EPIC, 2016), children themselves are generally 
constructed as too young to participate in debates such as this one. Indeed, parents are 
presented as worryingly ignorant from the experts’ point of view: ‘What worries me is 
that it’s hard for the parent to know’ (Walsh, 2017). Newman (2015) cites Angela 
Campbell, who works at Georgetown University’s Center on Privacy and Technology, 
and who was interviewed by the Washington Post, as saying, ‘If I had a young child, I 
would be very concerned that my child’s intimate conversations with her doll were 
being recorded and analyzed.’ The thing about young children is that they are not old 
enough to know better. In these circumstances, children are most likely to be talking to 
their IoToys, but least likely to be critically evaluating them. 
Comment by and between parents, children, families and communities is likely to be 
circulating informally as a result of these parties’ considerations of the various discussions 
in the general public sphere. The lack of such voices in the general public sphere, 
incorporating the attitudes and considerations of parents and children, demonstrates the 
need for ethnographic work in this area to capture and circulate everyday considered 
reflection upon the lived experience of, engagement with and concerns regarding IoToys. 
In addition to this, some children seem to be promoting IoToys through YouTube 
‘unboxing’ and ‘let’s play’ vlogs, either as part of professional YouTube channels or as part 
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of a more amateurish imitations of these professional ads. This children’s public sphere 
(YouTube) also requires investigation and discussion. As a quasi-marketing practice, these 
‘unboxing’ and ‘let’s play’ videos engage children both as producers (child vloggers) and 
consumers (advertising targets) in mixing advertisements with content – something not 
usually allowed in children’s television regulation. 
Discussion	  and	  conclusion	  
The research question motivating this article is: 
What does a critical discourse analysis of media commentary relating to the 
IoToys tell us about the variety of speaking positions occupied by 
stakeholders, and the discursive constructions of this set of ICT devices?  
The analysis here finds that there is a range of claimed and demonstrated ‘power’ at 
play in this space, complemented by differently constructed speaking positions. The 
main sources of power harnessed in this debate are commercial power, technological 
power, and consumer and advocacy groups. There is some evidence of the potential of 
regulatory power, although this is mainly latent at present. 
Commercial players are implicated through the construction and marketing of 
IoToys, in alliance with their tech partners. Secondary commercial players include 
‘product placement’ organisations that get smart toys to introduce targeted products in 
their discourse with children, and those organisations interested in acquiring 
information around how children play with and talk to smart toys, and the data sets that 
these activities create. To some extent, this commercial power is countered by the 
technological power wielded by white and black hat hackers. The aim of these 
individuals is to exploit weaknesses in the privacy and security systems of IoToys to 
reveal vulnerabilities on the one hand and their own skills on the other. Many of these 
tech experts run their own companies, and associated blogs or newsletters, so these 
actions offer multiple benefits in terms of promoting them and their work while, they 
would argue, making the internet safer for young children. 
Consumer and advocacy groups in this space are often motivated by privacy and 
security concerns, but generally seem more willing to take a stand than the 
organisations that have been funded specifically to intervene on citizens’ behalf (or, in 
the case of children, on behalf of minors). The groups across Europe and the United 
States concerned with these issues have carried out relatively successful publicity 
campaigns. However, with the comparatively limited resources afforded to these 
groups, as well as the multiple issues on which they may be campaigning, it is not yet 
clear whether this momentum can be sustained. 
Strong regulatory and policy advances are so far lacking. The only clear exception to 
this general rule is in Germany, where the regulator has made a clear statement about 
IoToys, My Friend Cayla and children’s smart watches. Apart from these two instances, 
regulators and government bodies seem unwilling to intervene in this space, prompting 
non-government advocates and consumer groups to expand their efforts as a means of 
filling the vacuum, trying to effect regulatory engagement. All these various actions and 
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reactions feed into the media’s search for hot-button topics that constitute communicative 
power through the provision of rich, deep material for comment and controversy.  
As for the discursive constructions on display, the dominant voice across media 
platforms is a commercial one. In addition to the IoToy product and its advertising – 
noting that some media organisations will be inhibited from comment because 
advertising revenues may be impacted – these commercial interests are looking for 
multiple ways to monetise their IoToy products. The terms and conditions signed by the 
consumer may have no indication that what they are agreeing to includes product 
placement by some of the biggest names in children’s culture. Further, toy 
organisations are not explicit about capturing, for example, the verbal records of 
children’s hopes, questions and confidences, retaining the rights to on-sell these data 
where possible. Because the manifestation of the IoToys discussed here occurs within 
the context of a free-market economy, commercial discourses are generally taken for 
granted: they are the continuous background to the other conversations because 
society is structured to support and profit from their existence. 
Opposing this general background noise of business as usual, the tech hackers, the 
media, and advocacy and consumer groups all vie for their share of voice, for their 
own reasons. Those reasons might be so complex that ‘raising my own profile’ 
becomes translated in the speaker’s mind as ‘making a difference’. Whatever the 
underlying discursive motivator(s), in the absence of these voices little would be 
happening to challenge the dominant commercial discourse, which peaks every year 
around Christmas. Even with the disparate voices of hackers, media and advocates, 
there is little evidence of intervention on the part of the small group of regulators and 
law-makers who have the structural power to change some of these practices and 
imbalances. 
The absent presences within the general public sphere, and therefore in this article, 
are the perspectives of the children, parents and families who use, love, hate and/or 
fear these IoToys products. However, the recent emergence of ‘unboxing’ and ‘let’s 
play’ YouTube videos centred around connected toys sees children now targeted across 
media platforms and co-opted as quasi-marketers, either through professionally based 
channels or by amateur child vloggers who ‘mimic the production and branding 
strategies of the professional channels’ (Nicoll & Nansen, 2017). This intricate 
transmedia relationship, where children’s play (media mimicry) and content production 
intersect with the commercial world, needs further thought and analysis. 
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